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Thank you very much, Professor O’Kelly, for that very kind intro-
duction.  I am delighted to be here and honored to take part in the dedica-
tion of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. 
Law is, in many ways, a backwards-looking field.  We litigate over 
facts that have already occurred, challenge deals that have already been 
signed, and apply rules of decision based on previously-established 
precedent or statutes already enacted.  To the extent that this Center and 
the symposium reflect on Berle’s work, they too are an exercise in look-
ing back.  Indeed, some might say the establishment of a Center named 
in Berle’s honor is a monument to the past. 
So, for a moment, let’s consider whether that’s such a good thing.  
Any sort of monument carries the risk of freezing a moment in time or 
rendering something fixed in place and content.  Where the monument 
you’re making is a piece of art capturing a fleeting moment of bliss, John 
Keats would wholeheartedly approve.  Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn 
tells us that “happy” are the trees that “cannot shed [their] leaves nor ev-
er bid the Spring adieu.”  But what if the monument attempts to capture 
and tell future generations of a particular figure’s greatness?  Should we 
then be talking about another poet—Percy Bysshe Shelley?  Shelley’s 
Ozymandias ridicules a now-battered and dilapidated statue erected to 
honor the Egyptian Pharaoh Ramesses the Great. 
So, which is it?  Are we today dedicating a Keatsean “Attic shape” 
that “dost tease us out of thought / as doth eternity,” or a Shelly-esque set 
of “[t]wo vast and trunkless legs of stone / stand[ing] in the desert?” 
I would suggest the answer is neither.  No matter your view of the 
aesthetic merits of Greek pottery or the utility of Egyptian relics, it is the 
two poems themselves that bestow immortality on the “fair youth” de-
picted on the Grecian Urn in Keats’s Ode or the “king of kings” whose 
statue has fallen into disrepair in Shelley’s Ozymandias.  It is an immor-
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tality reinvigorated by every English student who writes an essay on 
these poems or any judge who cites these English Romantic Poets in a 
speech about a corporate law scholar.  It is through this ongoing dialogue 
with the text that the subject matter still lives. 
Similarly, I don’t believe the mere establishment of a “Center” in 
Adolf Berle’s honor does much one way or another to burnish or tarnish 
his legacy and contributions.  What does matter, however, is precisely 
what this Center will foster, starting with this weekend’s symposium: a 
dialogue that invests Berle and his important work with an immortality 
of sorts.  And when the many gifted scholars in attendance here make 
their presentations, they will, I hope, do more than merely memorialize 
Adolf Berle. 
Berle, I believe, would have it no other way.  He was, first and 
foremost, a radical thinker—something that does not always go over well 
in the backwards-looking field of law.  Indeed, Berle was the kind of guy 
that can make you feel bad about yourself.  He was a very successful 
lawyer, a groundbreaking scholar, a diplomat, an assistant secretary of 
state, an ambassador, a speechwriter for the president, a policymaker, 
and a member of FDR’s so-called “brain trust.”  His resume alone prob-
ably deserves to have a Center built in its honor.  But more than any of 
these impressive credentials, he literally redefined the universe of Amer-
ican corporate law.  I’ll leave it to the various scholars among us to ex-
plain and to analyze the more nuanced and subtle of Berle’s contribu-
tions; I want to talk about a few of the perhaps very obvious things, 
things we take for granted. 
First, Berle was one of the original scholars to recognize the core 
concern of corporate law: the separation of ownership from control.  As a 
judge on the Delaware Court of Chancery, this particular observation is 
in a very real sense a meaningful part of my day-to-day work.  A great 
number of the lawsuits that I hear arise from this tension.  Of course, 
Berle also recognized early on that the rise of institutional investors did 
not mark the end of the ownership-control separation phenomenon.  In-
stead, it simply added additional layers of complexity.  Many institution-
al investors are themselves corporate (or corporate-like) entities that have 
the same disparate, disconnected ownership characteristics as the mass of 
individual shareholders.  If these institutions function as passive inves-
tors, they simply widen the gap between corporate managers and the in-
dividuals in society that are the ultimate beneficial owners.  If the institu-
tions function as active shareholders, then control again is shifted—from 
corporate managers to institutional managers—but ownership and con-
trol remain separate, and the phenomenon continues with the same in-
tense debates about its implications. 
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Second, having recognized this core concern about the separation of 
ownership and control, Berle also offered advice on what to do about it.  
Along with his partner, the economist Gardiner Means, Berle argued that 
managers were “trustees” of the shareholders and that they could exer-
cise the powers they had only for the benefit of those shareholders.  In 
other words, Berle articulated the governing premise of the fiduciary du-
ties that now inform nearly every aspect of Delaware corporate law.  As 
professors Bratton and Wachter (both of whom are participating, I be-
lieve, in the symposium) noted in an article they published last year, 
“[t]his was by no means a settled principle of law.”1 
Third, Berle put this notion of fiduciary duties in context by articu-
lating a two-part test for review of managerial action.  The first level of 
review is the technical power conferred on managers by articles of incor-
poration, bylaws, and statutory law.  The second level of constraint con-
sists of the common law fiduciary duties.  This is where Berle’s work 
touches my job, because he insisted that the judiciary had a legitimate 
role to play in ensuring managers met their fiduciary duties to sharehold-
ers.  It is particularly true in Delaware, where chancery and state supreme 
court judges have broad powers of equity that enable them to ensure that 
justice is done based on the unique facts of a given case.  There are nota-
ble instances in Delaware case law where our courts have set aside the 
actions of management even though those actions were technically legal.  
Almost forty years ago, for example, in a case styled Schnell v. Chris 
Craft Industries, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court strongly rejected the 
notion that directors’ compliance with the general statutory law was all 
that was required to meet their obligations. 
The equitable principles of fiduciary duty, the Schnell Court held, 
would overlay and constrain the statutory powers of directors.  This was 
not innovative; instead, it was part of the longstanding operation of our 
law and a manifestation of a principle that Berle initially offered. 
These basic principles have spurred intense debate ever since Berle 
first articulated them.  It is a debate that still rages today.  For example, 
the separation of ownership and control phenomenon is at the heart of the 
current shareholder-rights movement.  It also influences other timely 
corporate law debates, including proposals to federalize corporate law.  
Berle’s fundamental observation—which is today widely accepted as 
true—has nonetheless generated a pitched debate as to its precise impli-
cations.  Scholars, academics, and policymakers, although they credit 
Berle for his seminal observation, posit widely divergent arguments as to 
                                           
 1. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: 
Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 108 (2008). 
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what Berle’s observation means for corporation law and broader public 
policy. 
As I said before, I hope that despite this Center’s quite proper affec-
tion for Adolf Berle, the participants in this weekend’s symposium and 
future symposia will freely wrestle with and challenge every assumption 
he made and every conclusion he reached.  This is actually a wholesome 
thing, for as the Scottish philosopher David Hume observed, “Truth 
springs from argument amongst friends.”  This should not be any less so 
in academic or political circles.  And in the final analysis, I am confident 
we will find that corporate law has been made all the better because of 
the intense debate over the implications of Berle’s core observations 
about the separation of ownership and control. 
Finally, we should keep in mind that Berle made some of his most 
important and game-changing observations in the midst of the Great De-
pression—a time of unprecedented political and economic upheaval, a 
time not altogether unlike the present.  Then, as now, questions loomed 
about how to regulate corporate conduct and about the proper role the 
government should play in that regulation.  Astutely, Berle recognized 
that the stakeholders in this debate were more than just the stockholders 
and the managers of any particular corporation—they also included so-
ciety in general.  This, then, is the debate we must have.  What is the 
purpose of a corporation?  How does it best create wealth and serve the 
interests of society?  It is precisely the kind of “argument among friends” 
that I referenced earlier, that this new Center is uniquely positioned to 
facilitate. 
And, if anything, the stakes have only grown since Berle’s time.  
While the pertinent question in the 1930s was whether the corporate law 
of an individual American state could temper the exercise of an Ameri-
can corporation acting on a national scale, today the question is whether 
the globalization of product and capital markets has made it impossible 
for nation states—even the United States—to effectively regulate corpo-
rate behavior.  Berle lived and wrote in a time of substantial economic 
uncertainty and on the heels of marked changes in corporate America.  
He thought deeply about the causes of the economic crisis that con-
fronted his generation, the changing role of corporations in society, and 
the appropriate legal responses to both.  Berle articulated his 
groundbreaking conceptions of the corporation in a cogent and though-
tful fashion, unafraid to lend his voice to the ongoing debate.  Many of 
his ideas influenced the New Deal policies of the Roosevelt administra-
tion, which brought permanent changes in the American economy and 
culture.  To be sure, Adolf Berle’s ideas did not put to rest the ongoing 
discussion about the proper role of government or of corporations in 
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American society.  Nor would we want it to do so.  So long as America is 
comprised of free thinkers in a robust democracy it is inconceivable that 
anyone could put these great debates to rest.  But what Adolf Berle did 
was to contribute to the discussion in a significant and permanent way. 
And now it is our turn to do the same.  Berle contributed enormous-
ly to the corporate legal landscape, and we owe it to him to ensure that 
this Center, named in his honor, does not “decay” into a “colossal wreck” 
like the statue of Ramesses that so fascinated Shelley.  Instead, let it be 
like the poem itself, an enduring source of inspiration and challenge. 
I have a hunch that the Center will succeed because its first director 
is Professor Charles O’Kelly.  Like Adolf Berle, Charles O’Kelly is a 
corporate law scholar (and an expert on Delaware corporate law, I might 
add), and Chuck’s professional life also has been devoted to continuing 
and enriching the debate about the purpose of the corporation in our so-
ciety and to offering real world solutions for the problems we confront.  
Frankly, I cannot imagine a more appropriate and fitting director for the 
Adolf Berle Center.  And so, I want to congratulate Professor O’Kelly 
publicly, and wish him, and Seattle University, the best with the new 
Center. 
Thank you very much for inviting me to be with you today. 
